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Abstract
We consider an MRI scanning facility, run by a Radiology department, with
limited capacity. Several medical departments compete for capacity, and have private
information regarding their demand for scans. The fairness of the capacity allocation
by the Radiology department depends on the quality of the information provided
by the medical departments. We employ a generic Bayesian Game approach that
stimulates the disclosure of true demand (truth-telling), so that capacity can be
allocated fairly. We derive conditions under which truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated with a case study.
Key words: OR in Health Services, game theory, capacity allocation, private infor-
mation.
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1 Introduction
We consider an MRI scanning facility run by a Radiology department, that has to distribute
MRI scan capacity among several competing medical departments. The departments have
private information regarding their future demands. For a fair allocation, Radiology de-
pends on the information that the departments provide. How can the Radiology depart-
ment motivate the users to give an honest forecast of their demands in order to ensure a
fair allocation?
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Various types of MRI scans exist, each used to inspect different parts of the body [13].
Examples are scans of the heart, breasts, nervous system, and bones. It is common prac-
tice in most hospitals to dedicate adjacent time slots (blocks) in the appointment schedule
to identical MRI types. The demand for MRI scans can vary widely over time, especially
in academic institutions. New treatment protocols may result in an in- or decrease of MRI
requests; the same holds for the recruitment of new patient cohorts and changes in the
hospital’s patient mix. This asks for a periodical allocation of MRI capacity. For this it
is common that medical departments provide Radiology with a demand forecast for the
next period. Overestimating demand may be tempting, since it is likely that this leads
to a larger share of the scarce capacity. The quality of the MRI schedule depends on the
quality of the forecast. It is therefore essential for the Radiology department that medical
departments put maximum effort into providing a reliable and honest forecast, and do not
over- or underestimate their demand.
1.1 Problem Example
We illustrate the necessity of a reliable and honest forecast with an example of a facility
with two scanning types. For the first scanning type, a forecast that is lower than the
actual demand for the next period is provided. For the other scanning type, a forecast
that is higher than the actual demand for the next period is provided. Suppose that the
capacity allocated by Radiology equals the forecast of demand. Then for the first scanning
type, a waiting list develops because of incorrect allocation (figure 1(a)). For the second
scanning type, not all allocated capacity is needed and thus the scanner sits idle (figure
1(b)). We see that it is very well possible that in the same period, the MRI scanners are
(a) Scanning type 1 (b) Scanning type 2
Figure 1: Example for two scanning types
idle during certain blocks due to less actual demand for one type of scans, while at the
same time the waiting list for another scan type increases caused by a lack of capacity.
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1.2 Approach
The problem of capacity allocation to multiple competing users, as sketched above, has
several key properties. Namely (i) the users do not cooperate, (ii) the actual demands of
the users are private information, and (iii) the resource wants the users to truthfully reveal
their actual demand. Relevant models that capture these properties are combinatorial
auction models [4], where multiple bidders can place bids on several items at the same
time, and Bayesian games [6, 7, 8], non-cooperative games where each player has incomplete
information about the characteristics of the other users. While in a Bayesian game only
the demand of the users is needed, in a combinatorial auction also the price the users
are willing to pay is required. This, combined with the relatively simple analysis of the
Bayesian game model compared to that of the combinatorial auction model, determined
our choice for the Bayesian game approach. We are interested in conditions under which
the users tell the truth, that is, they provide the resource with their actual demand.
1.3 Literature
Bayesian Games are extensively described by Harsanyi [6, 7, 8]. For an introduction on this
class of games we refer the reader to [5]. In the literature on Bayesian games, two types of
models are often studied. In the first type of model a single resource communicates with
several users. The users do not cooperate, and the resource has private information. An
application of this model is given in [9]. In the second type of model a single resource
communicates with a single user. Now, the user has private information. Examples can for
instance be found in [15, 21]. Unlike these types of models, we consider a single resource
and multiple non-cooperative users with private information. To the best of our knowledge,
this has hardly been studied so far.
There is a vast body of literature on capacity allocation with truth-telling in the area
of supply chain management, see for example [3, 10, 20]. The main research questions are
how a supplier should allocate his capacity, and how the supplier can induce his buyers to
reveal their private information. Furthermore, many papers on capacity and/or resource
allocation in health care are available, such as [18], but these do not consider private in-
formation and truth-telling. This paper contributes to the literature by studying capacity
allocation under private information in a health care setting.
Several other problems in a health care context have been studied using Bayesian Games.
An application area is the patient-doctor relationship, where either the patient [21] or the
doctor [16] has private information. Another example is given in [19], where the authors
consider the principle of kidney exchange. Patients waiting for a kidney transplant present
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one or more potential donors. These donors however are not a match to the patient they
are related to. In order to find matching pairs, an exchange group of several patients and
their donors is formed. In the paper it is demonstrated with a Bayesian Game that it is
advantageous in some cases for patients not to reveal all information they possess about
their donors. In [1] an economic application is given. Multiple hospitals are regulated by a
central authority; hospitals do not cooperate with each other. The regulator has incomplete
information on the production information hospitals possess. A Bayesian Game is used
to study the effect of the information gap on the production contracts the regulator offers
the hospitals. We conclude this paragraph with [12], in which the international trading
and pricing of pharmaceuticals is studied. The author suggests to introduce asymmetric
information with respect to the local demand function of the country the products are sold
to. When the problem is modeled as a Bayesian Game, it can be shown that in equilib-
rium parallel imports of pharmaceuticals occur, in contrast to the complete information
situation.
1.4 Contents of Paper
Since the approach is not limited to the MRI scan example, we use generic terminology
(resources and users) in section 2 and 3. First we provide a detailed description of the
model. In the Results section that follows we show that it is optimal for users to provide
an honest forecast of their demand, which enables the resource to make a fair allocation. We
demonstrate the approach with a case study in section 4. We conclude with the Discussion
and Conclusions section.
2 Model
In this section we formulate the Bayesian Game. An overview of the notation introduced
is given in table 1.
Table 1: Notation introduced in Model section
Symbol Description
C Total amount of capacity available
Fi Forecast of demand by user i (i.e. request to resource)
Ai Capacity allocated to user i
Di Actual demand of user i
x Reward per unit of allocated capacity
y Penalty cost per unit of surplus capacity
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The allocation of capacity goes as follows. Users provide their forecast Fi for the next
period. The resource allocates capacity, resulting in an allocated amount Ai per user.
During the period the users reveal their actual demand. This process is repeated each
period. We make the following assumptions:
(i) All users make rational choices, i.e. they want to maximize benefits and minimize
costs.
(ii) The total amount requested by the users exceeds the resource’s capacity:
∑
j Fj > C.
(iii) The shared resource cannot allocate more capacity than is available:
∑
j Aj ≤ C.
(iv) No user has an actual demand that is higher than the resource’s capacity: 0 ≤ Di ≤
C.
(v) No user has any information about the private demand of another user. Let D−i =
{Dj}j 6=i represent the demands of users other than user i. We model the knowledge
of user i by the uniform distribution on [0, C]n−1,
pi(D−i) =
{
1
Cn−1 , if D−i ∈ [0, C]n−1,
0, else;
all demands are equally likely.
2.1 Utility Function
In order to avoid the situation described in the Introduction section, where simultaneously
the resource sits idle and there is a lack of capacity, we develop a utility function for
each user that discourages both the under- and overestimation of demand. Each user
aims to obtain at least an allocated amount Ai that equals his demand Di. Suppose all
users reward each unit of allocated capacity equally with x, and overestimation of demand
involves penalty cost y. A simple utility function that stimulates the desired behavior is:
Vi = xAi − y(Fi −Di)+, (1)
where (a)+ = max{a, 0}.
2.2 The Allocation Mechanism
The resource needs an allocation mechanism to distribute its capacity over the users.
Desirable properties of an allocation mechanism are:
(i) Each user receives a nonnegative amount: Ai ≥ 0.
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(ii) The total capacity is allocated:
∑
j Aj = C.
(iii) Every user receives at most the amount it requests: Ai ≤ Fi.
(iv) If the capacity of the resource increases, then all users should get more: Ai is increas-
ing in C.
Many allocation mechanisms satisfy these properties. One of these mechanisms that is used
often in practice is the mechanism that allocates capacity proportional to the forecasts:
Ai =
Fi∑
j Fj
C [17]. Then
Vi(F ;Di) = x
Fi∑
j Fj
C − y(Fi −Di)+ (2)
is the utility function of user i, which depends on the demands F = {F1, . . . , FN} of all
users, and on the user’s privately known actual demand Di.
2.3 Bayesian Game Formulation
Now we formulate the problem as a Bayesian game. Each user provides a forecast Fi, which
is a function of his private actual demand Di. We write Fi(Di) to denote this dependency.
This forecast reflects the claim of user i on the available capacity. The allocated capacity
Ai depends on all requests Fj(Dj), j = 1, . . . , N , and hence also on all the private demands.
The goal of each user is to maximize his expected utility by selecting a suitable strategy.
A strategy Fi(Di) of user i specifies which forecast the user should announce as a function
of its private information Di.
The strategies F ∗ = (F ∗1 (D1), . . . , F
∗
N(DN)) are a so-called Bayesian Nash equilibrium
if for each user i and for any private demand Di the requested number of units F
∗
i (Di)
maximizes the expected utility of the user:
F ∗i (Di) = argmax
Fi
∫
[0,C]n−1
Vi(F
∗
−i, Fi;Di)pi(D−i)dD−i,
where (F ∗−i, Fi) denotes the strategies F
∗ in which the strategy F ∗i (Di) of user i is replaced
by Fi, D−i = {Dj}j 6=i is the collection of private demands for users other than i, and
pi(D−i) is the prior belief of user i about D−i [14]. Hence, given the uncertainty on the
private demands of the other users, it does not pay for user i to deviate from his equilibrium
strategy because that will result in lower expected utility.
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3 Results
In this section we show that when the number of users exceeds 3, it is optimal for users to
provide an honest forecast. When the number of users is equal to 2 or 3, the same result
holds under weak conditions.
3.1 Equal Cost and Reward Parameters
To simplify calculations, we set x = y = 1 in the utility function, so Vi(F ;Di) =
Fi∑
j Fj
C −
(Fi −Di)+ (we consider other cost and reward parameters in section 3.2). We investigate
when truth-telling, Fi(Di) = Di, is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality
we consider user i = 1. His expected utility, given that the other users truthfully reveal
their demand, equals
E[V1(F ;D1)] =
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
F1
F1+
∑N
j=2Dj
C − (F1 −D1)+
CN−1
dD2 · · · dDN
=
1
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
F1
F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj
dD2 · · · dDN − (F1 −D1)+.
To analyze when truth-telling maximizes this expected utility, we calculate the derivative
with respect to F1. The values of F1 where the derivative equals zero or does not exist,
and the boundary values 0 and C are candidate values for a maximum. If the derivative
equals zero for some value F1 then we use the second derivative of the expected utility to
check whether this value is indeed a maximum or minimum. These derivatives and their
properties are as follows.
Theorem 1. Consider the situation with N users. The derivative of the expected utility
equals
∂E[V1(F ;D1)]
∂F1
=
1
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
∑N
j=2Dj
(F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj)
2
dD2 · · · dDN − I{F1>D1}, (3)
where IE is the indicator function of the event E that takes the value 1 if E is true and 0
otherwise. This derivative is positive if Fi < Di; the expected utility is then increasing in
Fi.
The second derivative of the expected utility,
∂2E[V1(F ;D1)]
∂F 21
=
1
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
−2∑Nj=2Dj
(F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj)
3
dD2 · · · dDN , (4)
is always negative. So, the derivative of the expected utility is decreasing in Fi, in particular
for Fi > Di .
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Proof. Without loss of generality let i = 1. If F1 < D1, then the derivative (3) reduces
to
1
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
∑N
j=2Dj
(F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj)
2
dD2 · · · dDN ,
which is always positive; the expected utility is increasing in F1.
It is easy to see that the second derivative (4) is negative. Hence, the derivative (3) of
the expected utility is decreasing in F1, in particular for F1 > D1.
According to this theorem, the expected utility is increasing if F1 < D1. Therefore,
user 1 wants to set F1 as large as possible. Because F1 < D1, user 1 sets F1 = D1 in the
limit.
Also by theorem 1 the derivative of the expected utility is decreasing in F1. Now if this
derivative is negative for all forecasts F1 > D1, then the expected utility is decreasing in
F1. So, user 1 wants to choose F1 as small as possible. Because F1 > D1, user 1 wants to
select F1 = D1 in the limit. In this case we conclude that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium; user 1 always tells the truth.
In the next subsections we investigate for several numbers of users when the derivative
of the expected utility for Fi > Di is indeed negative, and under which conditions truth-
telling is an equilibrium.
3.1.1 Truth-telling in Case of Two Users
In this section we analyze the allocation problem with two users. Then the derivative (3)
of the expected utility for F1 > D1 equals∫ C
0
D2
(F1 +D2)2
dD2 − 1 = ln
(
F1 + C
F1
)
+
F1
F1 + C
− 2, (5)
We want to know for which values of F1 this derivative is negative. If so, then the expected
utility of user 1 is decreasing and this user will select F1 = D1 — the truth-telling outcome
— to maximize its expected utility.
Theorem 2. Consider the situation with two users. Truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if the private demand of any user is at least 18.9% of the total capacity.
Proof. Without loss of generality consider user i = 1. By theorem 1, the derivative (5)
is a decreasing function in F1. This derivative is negative for all requests F1 ∈ (D1, C] if it
is negative for F1 = D1:
ln
(
D1 + C
D1
)
+
D1
D1 + C
− 2 ≤ 0.
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This inequality holds if D1 ≥ b2C with b2 ≈ 0.189, where b2 is such that the derivative (5)
is equal to zero for F1 = b2C.
In other words, the private demand of either of the two users should be larger than
roughly one-fifth of the capacity of the resource. The lower bound of 18.9% on the propor-
tion of privately known demand to the resource’s capacity may be too restrictive. What
happens if this lower bound is not met for user i, so Di < 0.189C? According to the
analysis in the proof of theorem 2 the expected utility of this user is maximal in forecast
Fi ≈ 0.189C. This forecast is larger than the actual demand Di; user i overestimates its
private demand.
3.1.2 Truth-telling in Case of Three and More Users
For three to six users, the results are as follows.
Theorem 3. Truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for N = 3 users if the private
demand of any user is at least 8.0% of the total capacity. For N = 4, 5, and 6 users,
truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First consider N = 3 users. Without loss of generality focus on user 1 and on
the case F1 > D1. According to (3), the derivative of the expected utility of user 1 equals:
1
C
∫ C
0
∫ C
0
D2 +D3
(F1 +D2 +D3)2
dD2dD3 − 1
=
2F1
C
ln
(
F1(F1 + 2C)
(F1 + C)2
)
+ 2 ln
(
F1 + 2C
F1 + C
)
− 1.
We know from theorem 1 that this expression is decreasing in F1. Hence, truth-telling is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if this expression is non-positive for F1 = D1,
2D1
C
ln
(
D1(D1 + 2C)
(D1 + C)2
)
+ 2 ln
(
D1 + 2C
D1 + C
)
− 1 ≤ 0.
Numerical evaluation reveals that this inequality holds if D1 ≥ b3C with b3 ≈ 0.080.
For the situation with more than three users, the complexity of the derivatives (3)
increases rapidly. We use the computing software Maple [11] to perform the calculations.
Thereafter, we once again use theorem 1 to establish that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if the first derivative is non-positive for F1 = D1. Numerical evaluation by
Maple reveals that the inequality is satisfied for N users for all D1 ≥ 0. Hence, truth-
telling is always a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for four till six users.
Hence, for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a situation with three users, we have a lower
bound on the demand per user. Note that this bound is smaller than the bound in the
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situation with two users. The lower bound disappears if we consider at least four users.
For situations with 7 users, we were not able to perform the necessary calculations within
reasonable time limits. Based on the results for 4 till 6 users we conjecture the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If there are more than 6 users, then truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Note that truth-telling is not a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, since there is another
(trivial) Bayesian Nash equilibrium, namely Fi = 0 for all i. However, this is not of any
practical value considering the problem setting.
3.2 Different Cost and Reward Parameters
In this section we return to the general utility function Vi(F ;Di) without the restriction
x = y = 1. We analyze what happens to the lower bounds on the actual demands of the
departments, as stated in the theorems 2 and 3.
The expected utility for user 1 now equals
E[V1(F ;D1)] =
x
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
F1
F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj
dD2 · · · dDN − y(F1 −D1)+.
The following theorem generalizes theorem 1, and is therefore presented without proof.
Theorem 4. Consider the situation with N users. The derivative of the expected utility,
∂E[V1(F ;D1)]
∂F1
=
x
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
∑N
j=2Dj
(F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj)
2
dD2 · · · dDN − yI{F1>D1},
is positive if Fi < Di; the expected utility is then increasing in Fi.
The second derivative of the expected utility,
∂2E[V1(F ;D1)]
∂F 21
=
x
CN−2
∫ C
0
· · ·
∫ C
0
−2∑Nj=2Dj
(F1 +
∑N
j=2Dj)
3
dD2 · · · dDN ,
is negative. The derivative of the expected utility is decreasing in Fi, in particular for
Fi > Di .
First, consider N = 2 users. According to theorem 4, the expected utility is increasing
for F1 < D1. Hence, user 1 chooses F1(D1) = D1 in the limit in case F1 < D1. If F1 > D1
then the derivative of the expected utility equals
x
(
ln
(
F1 + C
F1
)
+
F1
F1 + C
− 1
)
− y, (6)
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which is a generalization of (5). Also by theorem 4, this derivative is decreasing in F1.
Hence, if it is nonpositive for F1 = D1 then it takes negative values for all F1 > D1. This
happens if D1 ≥ b2C where the lower bound b2 is a root of expression (6) after substituting
F1 = b2C. Thus b2 solves
ln
(
b2 + 1
b2
)
+
b2
b2 + 1
− 1− y/x = 0. (7)
This equation shows that lower bound b2 is a function of y/x, the relative value of the
‘cost’ parameter y to the ‘reward’ parameter x (see figure 2). Observe that for y/x = 1
Figure 2: Lower bound b2 as a function of y/x.
the lower bound b2 agrees with the result in theorem 2. If y/x increases then the penalty
function with weight y becomes more and more important compared to the value of the
allocated capacity with weight x. Since the user adds so much relative value to the penalty,
truth-telling more and more easily becomes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The lower bound
b2 decreases, and in particular, b2 tends to zero as y/x increases.
We perform the same analysis for situations with three and four users, see the figures
3(a) and 3(b) respectively. For three users, the lower bound b3 is positive as long as
y/x ≤ 1.3. For larger values of y/x there is no positive solution to (7). Thus, if y/x > 1.3
then truth-telling is always a Bayesian Nash equilibrium; there is no lower bound on the
demand of the users to ensure an equilibrium.
We observe the same for four users. The lower bound b4 is positive for y/x < 0.8. For
larger values of y/x truth-telling is always a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The analysis for
five and more users goes along the same lines, and is therefore omitted.
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(a) Lower bound b3 for 3 users. (b) Lower bound b4 for 4 users.
Figure 3: The lower bounds bNC for N = 3 and N = 4 users as a function of y/x.
4 Numerical Example
We illustrate the model with a numerical example. We return to the MRI scanner example
from the Introduction section, and consider four departments that each make requests for
a specific scanning type, namely oncological (O), cardiovascular (C), neurological (N), and
musculoskeletal (M). Capacity is distributed proportionally according to equation (2), and
the cost and reward parameters are both equal to 1, as in section 3.1. The MRI scan
facility has a fixed capacity C of 1000 scans per month.
We start in month 1, and obtain the estimates of future demand (Fi). Recall that capacity
is allocated by the Radiology department, having no knowledge on the actual demand Di.
The demand forecasts Fi and allocated capacities Ai are given in the first two columns of
table 2. At the end of month 1, the actual demand Di is known. This information can
be used to penalize the departments, if necessary. The other columns of table 2 give the
actual demand Di, the deviation of the allocated amount Ai and forecast Fi from Di, and
the value of the utility function Vi.
We see that in month 1 the waiting list increases with 107 MRI scans (scanning types
oncological, neurological, and musculoskeletal), while there is unused capacity of 34 MRI
scans (scanning type cardiovascular). Note that there is no penalty on the surplus demand
related to the allocated capacity (i.e. D −A), since we only focus on the truth-telling ele-
ment in the problem. In the example, it is implicitly assumed that surplus demand is lost.
This lost demand could represent MRI scans that are performed at another institution,
or not performed at all, because the physician decides upon another method of diagnostics.
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Department Fi Ai Di Fi −Di % Fi −Di Ai −Di Vi
O 137 126 127 10 8% -1 116
C 130 119 85 45 53% 34 74
N 630 578 623 7 1% -45 571
M 193 177 238 -45 -19% -61 177
All 1090 1000 1073 17 2% -73 938
Table 2: Month 1: forecast of demand Fi, allocated capacity Ai, actual demand Di, devi-
ation of Di from Fi and Ai, and utility Vi
We assume that the departments learn from the penalty given at the end of month 1
and therefore in month 2 provide an honest estimate (i.e. Fi = Di for all i). Without loss
of generality, we assume that the actual demands of the departments in month 2 equal
that of month 1. Capacity is again allocated proportionally according to (2). See table 3
for results.
Department Fi Ai Di Fi −Di % Fi −Di Ai −Di Vi
O 127 118 127 0 0% -9 118
C 85 79 85 0 0% -6 79
N 623 581 623 0 0% -42 581
M 238 222 238 0 0% -16 222
All 1073 1000 1073 0 0% -73 1000
Table 3: Month 2: forecast of demand Fi, allocated capacity Ai, actual demand Di, devi-
ation of Di from Fi and Ai, and utility Vi
In month 2 the waiting list increases with 73 MRI scans, which equals the capacity
shortage of
∑
j Dj − C, but there is no unused capacity. Figure 4 compares the difference
between the allocated capacity Ai and actual demand Di for both months. Furthermore,
we see an increase in utility for all departments compared to month 1, while capacity is
distributed more fairly.
5 Discussion & Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a Radiology department (the resource) that has to distribute
MRI scanning capacity among competing medical departments (the users). Radiology uses
forecasts of demand, provided by the medical departments, to distribute the scanning ca-
pacity. The actual value of their demand is only known to the medical departments. When
the departments over- or underestimate the demand it can occur that the actual demand
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Figure 4: Difference between allocated capacity Ai and actual demand Di for both months.
is less than the allocated capacity (i.e. the scanner sits idle) or the actual demand is larger
than the allocated capacity. Both situations can arise simultaneously. In order to have a
fair allocation, where all available capacity is actually used, Radiology should motivate the
departments to provide an honest forecast of their demand.
We have introduced a generic approach, where a penalty is set on the difference between
the forecast and actual demand. This penalty was incorporated in the utility function of
each user. With a Bayesian Game we show that it is then optimal for each user to provide
an honest demand forecast (the truth-telling equilibrium), and as a result the resource can
make a fair distribution of available capacity. When the number of users is small, certain
restrictions on the relative size of the demands apply.
Topics for further research would for instance be the reward users place on allocated capac-
ity. Even though proportional allocation is intuitively appealing, and satisfies the desired
properties of an allocation mechanism as stated in section 2.2, other allocation mechanisms
also might be of interest and may be better related to reality for some practical cases. Also,
using a combinatorial auction to model the problem, as mentioned in the introduction sec-
tion, could be a valuable extension.
We have shown that even with minor restrictions on the behavior of users, it is possible
to attain a truth-telling equilibrium, where the shared resource can make a fair allocation
and all capacity is used.
The authors would like to thank Richard Boucherie for his useful comments.
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